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Abstract.  This paper examines data for stock prices and price levels of 14 developed
countries during the post-WWII era and compares their behavior in that sample with
behavior over the past two centuries in the UK and the US.  Contrary to much of the
literature of the past several decades, we find  that nominal equity prices do, in fact,
keep pace with movements in the overall price level.  Our results suggest, however,
that this is only the case over long periods.   The puzzle therefore is not that equities
fail the test as inflation hedges, as had been quite widely believed, but that they take
so long to pass. G10, E44.  Keywords. Stock prices, inflation, Fisher effect,
neutrality, cointegration.1
In principle, equities ought to be an inflation hedge.  In practice, however, evidence of such
behavior has been difficult to come by.  With few exceptions, studies show that nominal returns on
equities do not keep pace with inflation and that real returns and inflation are, in fact, negatively
correlated.  Indeed the disparity between theory and data was so common place that it became a
staple of textbook discussions  of financial market behavior. 
The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the evidence.  To do so we use data for fourteen
OECD countries over the post-World War II period and time series for the UK and the US over the
longer period 1790 to 2000.  What emerges is a rather different picture from the commonly accepted
one.  During the high inflation period in the 1970s and early 1980s in industrial countries real stock
prices did fall.  Real returns were therefore substantially negative.  In subsequent years, however,
those declines were reversed and more than offset by increases.  The patterns of these later increases
moreover were very similar to those that took place in the immediate postwar years in what arguably
was a catch up from the  previous wartime inflation.  The puzzle therefore is not that equities fail the
test as inflation hedges, but that they take so long to pass.  
These results and those of related tests are reported in section II below.  As an entree to that
discussion, we briefly review the theory and the previous literature in section I.  Section III presents
some broader conclusion suggested by these findings and outlines additional work to be undertaken
on this subject.
I.  Theoretical Considerations
In the standard textbook version of the Fisher equation the nominal yield on a bond is
decomposed into two components, the anticipated rate of inflation over the life of that instrument and
the ex ante, or anticipated, real interest rate on the bond.  The real variable, the ex ante real interests
rate, thus is immune to changes in the nominal variable, inflation, provided that the latter are
anticipated.  Employing that same logic, researchers, have posited a direct counterpart of this bond-
market Fisher equation in studying equity market behavior (see, for example, Fama and Schwert,
1977).  The nominal return on equities R
e
t is  assumed to consist of two components, the ex ante real
return 
e
t  and the rate of inflation that agents anticipate E[ pt] given their information set 
The difference between equities and bonds, however, is that the income stream yielded by2
bonds is fixed before the fact, while that yielded by equities is not, since firms' nominal earnings and
hence equity prices and dividends can be expected to rise in line with product prices.  This difference
in the characteristics of the two types of instruments means that the conventional Fisher equation











t +  pt,( 2 )
where  pt is the actual rate of inflation and the bracketed term on the far right side of (1) is therefore
the unanticipated rate of inflation.
The reasoning underlying the relationship between returns and inflation could also be applied
to the level of equity prices and the price level.  In the standard model of equity pricing the nominal
price of a common stock in the absence of earnings growth, P
e is simply the present discounted value








Assuming neutrality, we can write an analogous relation linking the nominal equity price, real





t + pt,( 4 )
where lowercase variables are the natural logs of their uppercase counterparts and  = ln{(D/P)/R
e)}.
Tests of the relationship between equity returns and inflation have generally used regression
analogues to equation (1) or (2) as their basis, equations taking the form either of
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t =  + E[ pt] + { pt-E[ pt]} + t, (2a)3
1  These studies include Feldstein (1980), Fama (1981), and Geske and Roll (1983).
    
where ,  and  are coefficients to be estimated and  is an error term.  In the terminology of Fama
and Schwert (1977), equities are hedges against anticipated inflation if =1, and a complete inflation
hedge if ==1.
A considerable number of studies have rejected one, and generally both of these hypotheses,
finding low and even negative coefficients for  and .  In addition to Fama and Schwert, other
studies reporting such results include Guletkin (1983) and Kaul (1987).  Indeed a sizable literature
has developed on this subject, the object of which has been to test various explanations for this
failure.
1
Overlooked in most of this recent work, however, are the details of Irving Fisher's analysis
of these issues.  In contrast to modern interpretations of the Fisher effect, which usually simply posit
the Fisher equation and justify it on the grounds of market efficiency, Fisher took care to trace out
the process by which interest rates adjusted to inflation.  Perhaps influenced by the weak empirical
results that he had obtained, Fisher viewed the adjustment as a circuitous and lengthy affair.  As a
practical matter he considered such adjustments more often than not to be incomplete and
characterized by informational problems including asymmetries between the more sophisticated
business sector borrowing funds and the less sophisticated consumers ultimately doing the lending.
To our knowledge, he engaged in no formal analysis of equity-market behavior.  Much of the current
discussion of the Fisher effect is therefore historically inaccurate.  More important, it ignores issues
that Fisher himself quite evidently regarded as crucial, and which in fact may be a good deal more so
than generally believed.
The recent literature on the bond-market Fisher equation is a case in point.  Problems related
to expectations’ formation and differences between short-run and long-run behavior are highlighted
in these studies.  For example, Mishkin (1993) using bivariate cointegration tests finds a long-run
Fisher effect, but no short-run effect.  Crowder and Hoffman (1996) using more powerful multivariate
analogues of such tests corroborate these findings.  Evans and Lewis (1995) do provide evidence of
a short-run effect,  but they model inflation expectations using a Markov switching model to allow
for the effects of changes in the monetary regime, rather than relying on the simple proxies used in4
2  Two other studies that bear mention are Choudhry (2000) and Solnik and Solnik (1999).
 Both provide evidence of a positive relationship between nominal equity returns and various
measures of anticipated inflation.   Neither, however, shows anything close to complete adjustment
to actual inflation.
3  Their conclusions are in fact in line with those reached earlier by Cagan (1974) in one of
the few earlier  studies that have provided at least some support the hypothesis of invariance of real
equity returns to inflation.  Cagan  used average rates of change of equity prices from the late 1930s
(the starting dates differ slightly from one country to the next) to 1969 as his units of observation.
He found a positive  relation between the two but concluded that there were extremely long lags in
the adjustment of equity prices to inflation.  As Kaul (1987) pointed out, however, adjustment still
appeared to be incomplete in the Cagan data, since for many of Cagan's countries viewed individually
the average rate of inflation exceeded the average rate of change of nominal equity prices.
most other studies.
Several recent studies have presented more positive evidence on the relation between equity
returns and inflation.  These include Boudokh and Richardson (1993) and Lothian and Simaan
(1998).
2  The first uses long historical time series for the U.S. and the U.K.; the second, multi-
country time series for the period since 1973.  Both report results that are consistent with a long-run,
but not a short-run, relationship.  One question that can be raised with regard to Boudokh and
Richardson’s findings, however, is whether they are applicable to recent decades, since it is quite
possible that the structure of the relationship has changed and that this structural change has gone
undetected in their long data set, which by its very nature gives heavy weight to earlier periods.  The
evidence presented by Lothian and Simaan suggest that such a change has not occurred, but that
paper is subject to a potential problem of another sort.  It uses very simple techniques, presenting
graphical evidence and bivariate regressions of period averaged data for the 18 OECD countries
studied.
3  As the authors point out, the results could be purely artifacts of the period over which the
data had been averaged.
II.  Empirical Results
We use two bodies of data in the paper.  The first is a panel data set consisting of annual
series for the United States and 13 other OECD countries over the period 1949 to 1999.  The price
level is measured by the consumer price index or similar cost-of-living index; the equity-price index
used in computing nominal equity returns is whatever index is reported by the International Monetary
Fund in their International Financial Statistics, generally, though not always, an index of industrial5
4  Figures for the cost-of-living indexes are yearly averages as listed in line 64 of the
International Financial Statistics; the equity price indexes are yearly average series listed in line 62.
Because the IMF equity data do not include dividends, we use measures of the average rates of
growth of equity prices, as a proxy for equity returns.
share prices.
4  Since we want data for a large number of countries over as lengthy a period as possible
we use these data even though dividends are omitted.
Our second body of data is a long historical data set for the UK and the US.  The UK data
are for the period 1790 to 2000; the US data are for the somewhat shorter period 1800 to 2000.   As
will become apparent from the discussion immediately below, long historical data of this sort can be
a useful complement to the panel data.
II.A. Overview of the Panel Data 
Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 provide an overview of behavior in the panel data.  Shown in
Figure 1 is the average of the de-meaned log of the real equity price indexes in the 14 counties and
one-standard-deviation bands about those averages.  Shown in Figure 2 are comparable figures for
the first differences of this ratio, our proxy for real returns.  Presented in Table 1 are means, standard
deviations and first order autocorrelation coefficients for the changes in log real equity prices.
Several features of these charts deserve comment.  The first is the upward drift in average real
equity prices over the full time period.  We see this quite clearly in Figure 1.  The bands plotted in
that chart suggest, moreover, that a similar pattern must have prevailed in most of the countries
individually.  This is confirmed further by a glance at the country means listed in Table 1. The changes
in log real equity prices range from an average of 0.4 per cent per annum for New Zealand to an
average of 6.0 per cent per annum for Germany.  A second feature of the data brought out by both
Figure 1 and Figure 2 is the series of  long swings that characterize these data.  For roughly the first
two decades real equity prices increased.  Over the next decade and a half or so, in contrast, they
decreased, only to increase once again over the latest decade and a half.
The result is two protracted cycle-like movements.  In the terminology used in the National
Bureau of Economic Research’s business cycle analysis, there is an “expansion phase” running from
1949 to 1969, the year in which the average series peaks, followed by a “contraction phase” ending
with a trough in 1982.  If we arbitrarily call the year 2000 the peak and assume that 1939 marked an6
5  See Lothian and Taylor (1996, 1997) for discussions of this issue in the context of the PPP
relationship.  General  discussions in the time-series econometric literature include Shiller and Perron
(1985) and Hakkio and Rush (1991).
earlier peak (as in Cagan, 1975), we see two approximately thirty-year, peak-to-peak cycles with
expansions that in both instances are approximately twice as long as the contractions.
In making such calculations,   we are not hinting at a structural explanation for the  two sets
of movements.  The object is simply to provide a description of behavior over this period.   What it
shows – and this is the third important point brought out by the charts – is the paucity of truly
independent movements in the data over these fifty years.  This is a fortiori the case for  the period
from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s that has been most heavily studied.  It is not surprising
that negative findings have been reported for that sample.  Real equity prices declined during these
years in the midst of high and, in many countries secularly rising, inflation.  While such behavior  does
not now appear representative of experience over the sample period as a whole, this was not at all
clear fifteen or so years ago.  Still dominating the data at that point was the downward swing  in real
equity prices that began in the mid-1970s.  That being so, no amount of econometric ingenuity could
have solved the problem and come up with positive findings using data for that  sample alone. 
This last feature of the data is a further illustration of the phenomenon that has been discussed
very heavily in the literature on purchasing power parity: the importance of data span, as opposed to
data  frequency.  Distinguishing between slow mean reversion and unit-root behavior has proven
almost impossible using conventional tests and single-country time series; extremely long time series
or panel data are required.
5  This should not be surprising.  If the deviations from long-term
equilibrium are persistent, the number of episodes in which such deviations occur rather than year-by-
year or quarter-to-to-quarter behavior within those episodes will contain the more meaningful
information about equilibrium behavior.
II.B.    Unit Root Tests for Nominal Equity Prices and CPIs
Since it is clear that equity prices and the general level of  prices at best are only very  weakly
connected over the short run, we focus on the long run.  The specific issues that we address are
whether over such time spans, the two do in fact bear the positive relationship suggested by theory
and whether nominal equity prices have (at least) kept pace with inflation.7
A standard way of addressing long-term behavior is in terms of cointegration analysis, since
as Engel and Granger (1987) have demonstrated, there is a direct correspondence between the
econometric concept of cointegration and the economic concept of long-run equilibrium.  A
necessary condition for two series to be cointegrated is that they both integrated of the same order.
We therefore first conducted unit root tests for log equity prices, log price levels and their first
differences.  We used both augmented Dickey Fuller tests and Phillips Perron tests in each instance.
Test results for the log levels of the CPI and the equity price index are reported in Tables  2a and 2b
respectively.  In no instance, could we reject the unit root null for either of the two series.  We
therefore conducted similar tests for the first differences of the logs of the two series.  These are
reported in Tables 3a and 3b.  Here the results were mixed. For the difference in log nominal equity
prices we could always reject the unit root null.  For the CPI the results varied by country.  Log
equity prices therefore appear to be I(1); while for the difference in the  log CPI,  the evidence is less
clear.
Given this indeterminancy we ran tests for both the levels and the first differences of real
equity prices.  In the first case, we allowed for a deterministic trend in real equity prices.  The second
presupposes the existence of a stochastic trend.  Arguably, it is the more realistic of the two.  Any
upward drift in real equity prices is, we suspect, most likely due to factors like productivity shocks
the effects of which are one-off but highly persistent.  They will therefore be better approximated by
a stochastic trend rather than a deterministic trend.
II.C.    Unit Root Tests for Real Equity Prices
In analyzing real equity prices, the question that we address is whether the two series do in
fact share a common trend  –  whether CPIs and equity price indexes are cointegrated and whether,
as theory suggests, they bear a one-to-one long-run relationship to one another.  The simplest way
to test for such a relationship is to examine the behavior of log real equity prices.  To see why this
is so consider the following regression:
    
p
e
t =  +  pt + t,( 5 )
    
where  and  are coefficients and  is the error term.8
Suppose  p
e and p are cointegrated and related one-to-one.  Then  will be stationary and 
will be unity.  One way to test whether these conditions hold is to impose the constraint =1, in
which case (5) becomes: 
    
rp
e
t =  + t,( 6 )
    
where rp
e = p
e - p, the log of real equity prices, and then to apply a unit root test to this ratio.  In the
simplest case, this is a test of the hypothesis  = 1 in the autoregression:
    
rp
e
t =  + rp
e
t-1 + 	t,( 7 )
    
If we reject this hypothesis, the implication is that rp
e is mean reverting and does so at a speed of 1-
per period.
 Hamilton (1994) argues that this is more powerful than the conventional two-step Engle and
Granger cointegration tests.  This increased power comes about, however, as a result of imposing the
constraint = 1 in equation (5).   This can be tested using the procedure described in Hamilton (1994,
pp. 608-613).
We conducted these tests for each of the countries individually both with and without a
deterministic trend in the regression.  We report these results in the upper half of Table 4a.  In no
instance could we reject the unit root null.  In all instances, however, we obtained point estimates of
 that were less than one, but in most instances not substantially so.  This is consistent with very slow
reversion to trend, but certainly offers little proof that such behavior is actually characteristic of these
data.  It could be that it is and that low test power is obscuring that fact; alternatively real equity
prices could contain a permanent component.
To try to increase test power, we treat the data for the 14 countries as a panel data set and
use the Im et al (1997) t-bar test.  The t-bar test statistic is the average of the individual t statistics from
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests for each of the 14 countries in our study standardized by
subtracting the expected value of the distribution of the t statistics under the null hypothesis of a unit root and
dividing by the standard deviation.  Estimates for the expected values and variances are calculated by Im et al
(1997) and reported in Table 2 of their paper for ADF tests with and without a trend for lag lengths from 0 to
8.  This standardized t-bar statistic is shown to be distributed standard normal. The results for our9
6  One such problem  is cross-country correlation (see O’Connell, 1998); a second is the
possibility that one country (or a few countries) are responsible for the rejection (see Taylor and
Sarno, 1998).
panel are presented in the lower half of Table 4a. These tests reject the unit-root null in three of four
instances when a time trend is included in the test regression, but in only one instance when the trend
is excluded.  There are, moreover, several potential econometric problems surrounding the use of
these tests that could cause them to be misleading
6  For these and for other reasons we turn to the
differenced data.
The results of these tests are presented in Table 4b.   Here the evidence is unambiguous.  In
all of the countries viewed individually, we can reject the unit root null at very high levels of
significance in the differenced data.    Hence even though there may  permanent shocks may affect
the relationship between the level of nominal equity prices and the price level, their rates of change
converge.
II.D. Evidence from the long-term time series
 Fifty years worth of observations on the surface appears to be more than sufficient for valid
statistical inference.  As  earlier discussion indicated, the data examined here  are dominated by only
two long-lived cycle-like movements.   Separating trend from cycle and discerning the true long-term
drift of real equity prices is, therefore, extremely difficult.  The use of multi-country data solves the
problem to some degree but not completely, since there is likely to be at least some cross-country
correlation in the data, and since in any event such data sets are still too short,
The historical data for the UK and the US mentioned above are an  additional way of  dealing
with this issue.  Figures 4 and 5 show plots of the log real equity price indexes for the UK and the
US and their two nominal components over the periods 1790 to 2000 and 1800 to 2000, respectively.
Figure 3 provides a plot of one county’s real equity price series against the other’s.   Several features
of these charts deserve comment.  The first is the substantial and accelerating upward trends in the
nominal series for both countries particularly during the course of the last century.  The other is the
more moderate, but still upward, drift in  both countries’ real equity price series.   As in the panel
data, equities again prove to be an inflation hedge.  Again, however, it takes an exceedingly long time
for this to happen.  At shorter, though still quite lengthy time horizons, there is a negative relationship10
between price levels and the real equity prices.  Following accelerations in the price level we see long
cyclical-type downswings in real equity prices lasting years.  We see this in both countries during both
of the two World Wars, the US Civil  War, and the Napoleonic Wars, in the US a few decades later
in the nineteenth century and, as earlier mentioned, in both countries during the two decades
following the breakdown of Bretton Woods. 
More formal evidence on the behavior of real equity prices in the two countries over this long
period is presented in Table 5.   Shown there are the results of unit root tests for both the levels and
first differences of log real equity prices.   The results for the  levels are mixed – rejection for the UK
but not the US.  As with the panel data, the results for the first differences show strong rejections in
all instances.  The inference to be drawn is therefore similar:  Over the long run we see inflation and
nominal equity returns converge as well as a tendency for nominal returns to drift up relative to
inflation.
III.  Summary and conclusions
In this paper we examine data for stock prices and price levels of 14 developed countries
during the post-WWII era and compare behavior in that sample with behavior over the past two
centuries in the UK and the US.   The evidence derived from both is virtually the same. 
Contrary to much of the literature of the past several decades, we find  that equities are in fact
an inflation hedge.  Our results suggest, however, that this is only the case over very long periods.
They, therefore, corroborate the findings reported by Cagan (197 4) in a paper written  as the decline
in real equity prices of the 1970s had just gotten underway.  Examining a multi-country data set
similar to ours, he concluded that equity markets did adjust to inflation, but that the adjustment period
lasted more than a decade.
The issue that needs to be addressed is why this adjustment process is so drawn out and,
hence, why departures of real equity prices from neutrality are so long lived.  Viewed from the
perspective of the modern literature in both finance and in economics more broadly defined, such
behavior is a puzzle of the first dimension.  Market efficiency and the rational expectation’s
hypothesis are usually taken to imply quick adjustment of economic variables to shocks and neutral
behavior of real variables even over rather short periods.  This is not what either we or Cagan have
found.  On the contrary, both sets of results are much more in line with those reported very much11
earlier by Irving Fisher in his empirical analysis of what subsequently has been termed "the Fisher
effect."  Commenting on the extremely slow and incomplete adjustment of nominal interest rates to
inflation, he wrote (1930, p. 416) "[I]f adjustment were perfect, unhindered by any failure to foresee
future changes in the purchasing power of money or by custom or law or any other impediment, we
should have found a very different set of facts."
The alternative explanation sees the negative relation between returns and inflation as
behavioral phenomenon.  Barnes, Boyd, and Smith (1999) argue that inflation is non-neutral, that
increases in inflation give rise to capital market inefficiencies and hence adversely affect  investment
and real income.  The appearance of long lags in adjustment in their view is really two separate
movements – a decline in real equity prices brought about  by the increase in inflation and resultant
decline in real income, followed by a rise in real equity prices due to the subsequent decline in
inflation and rise in real income.  
Friedman, in contrast, sees the variability of inflation  –  rather than the rate per se – as the
problem.  More variable inflation, in his view, mean less predictable inflation.  The result is a
decrease in the efficiency of the price system, which in turn leads to lower real income and higher
unemployment.  Friedman makes this argument in connection with the Phillips Curve, but it is also
applicable here.12
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Table 1. Summary statistics for real equity returns, 1950-1999
Mean Std. Dev. Rho
Australia 1.1 16.9  0.188 
Canada 2.9 13.8  -0.003 
Denmark 2.3 17.5  0.056 
France 3.9 18.5  0.189 
Germany 6.0 19.3  0.362 
Ireland 2.7 20.0  0.338 
Italy 2.0 24.5  0.333 
Japan 4.8 19.2  0.226 
Netherlands 3.9 16.9  0.456 
New Zealand 0.4  17.6  0.186 
Norway 1.4 18.9  0.154 
Sweden 5.6 17.5  0.120 
UK 3.0 15.8  0.196 
US 5.4 13.5  0.190 
14-Country average 3.2  17.9  0.214 
Note:  Means and standard deviations were computed for first
differences of log real equity prices and have been multiplied by
100.  Rho is the first order autocorrelation coefficient.18
Table 2a.  Unit root tests for log level of CPI; 
annual data, 1949 to 1999
   pt = a0 + a1  pt-1  +     bi     pt-i
ADF test  P-P test
Australia -0.024 -0.635 
Canada -0.490 0.176 
Denmark -0.683 -0.554 
France -0.343 -1.020 
Germany -0.053 0.369 
Ireland -0.856 -0.229 
Italy -0.696 0.404 
Japan -2.158 -1.234 
Netherlands -1.161 -1.181 
New Zealand -0.622  -0.070 
Norway -0.165 -0.662 
Sweden -0.792 -0.196 
UK -0.753 0.074 
US -0.550 0.634 
Critical values for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
and the Phillips-Perron tests at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance
are -3.58 and -2.93. Lag length on ADF chosen using Akaike
Criterion.19
Table 2b. Unit root tests for log level of nominal equity prices; 
annual data, 1949 to 1999
   p
e
t = a0 + a1  p
e
t-1  +     bi     p
e
t-i
ADF test  P-P test
Australia  0.150  0.238
Canada -0.741 -0.699
Denmark  0.289  0.408
France -0.192 -0.340
Germany -1.148 -1.660
Ireland 1.043  1.158
Italy -0.382 -0.270
Japan -1.665 -1.640
Netherlands 0.495  0.817
New Zealand  0.369  0.241
Norway 1.136  1.313
Sweden 1.209  1.231
UK 0.688  0.738
US 0.651  0.662
Critical values for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance are -3.58
and -2.93. Lag length on ADF chosen using Akaike Criterion.20
Table 3a. Unit root tests for first difference of log CPI; 
annual data, 1949 to 1999
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Critical values for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance are -3.58
and -2.93.Lag length on ADF chosen using Akaike Criterion.21
Table 3b. Unit root tests for first difference of log nominal equity price; 
annual data, 1949 to 1999
   
2p
e
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e





Australia -5.939 -6.070 
Canada -7.415 -7.690 
Denmark -6.276 -6.229 
France -5.820 -5.897 
Germany -3.264 -4.767 
Ireland -5.405 -5.201 
Italy -5.146 -4.858 
Japan -6.007 -6.048 
Netherlands -4.949 -4.489 
New Zealand -3.698  -5.608 
Norway -6.013 -5.961 
Sweden -6.305 -6.304 
UK -6.161 -6.312 
US -6.306 -6.277 
Critical values for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance are -3.58
and -2.93. Lag length on ADF chosen using Akaike Criterion.22
Table 4a. Unit root tests for log level of real equity price; 
annual data, 1949 to 1999
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Australia -2.279 -1.990 -1.881 -2.167 
Canada -2.406 -2.860 -2.380 -2.875 
Denmark -0.702 -1.835 -0.620 -1.813 
France -1.319 -1.456 -1.121 -1.356 
Germany -1.791 -2.270 -2.285 -2.397 
Ireland -0.735 -2.344 -0.720 -1.607 
Italy -2.256 -2.292 -1.784 -1.776 
Japan -1.781 -3.077 -1.687 -2.093 
Netherlands -1.047 -1.392 -0.099 -0.667 
New  Zealand -2.836 -2.874 -2.150 -2.003 
Norway -0.567 -0.532  0.805 -0.451 
Sweden 0.839 -0.614 -0.714 -0.743 
UK -0.735 -1.901 -0.750 -1.544 
US -0.379 -0.849 -0.610 -1.193 
Critical values for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests without trend at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of
significance are -3.58 and -2.93.  Critical values for Dickey-Fuller,
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests with trend at
0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance are -4.15 to -4.17 and -3.50 to
3.51, depending upon the exact form of the test regression.  Lag
length on ADF chosen using Akaike Criterion.
t-bar test
0 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags
ADF tests; with intercept, no trend 2.528  0.433  1.841  1.403 
ADF tests; with intercept and trend 3.666  1.014 2.924 2.281
The t-bar statistic (Im et al, 1997) is distributed standard normal.
Critical values for 2 tail test for 0.01 and 0.05 level of significance
are 2.54 and 1.96.23
Table 4b.  Unit root tests for first difference of log real equity price;
annual data, 1949 to 1999
    
2 rp
e
t = a0 + a1      rp
e
t-1  +     bi     rp
e
t-i
ADF test P-P test
Australia -5.432 -5.573 
Canada -6.965 -7.043 
Denmark -5.748 -6.415 
France -5.652 -5.731 
Germany -6.014 -4.523 
Ireland -5.116 -4.702 
Italy -4.952 -4.730 
Japan -3.200 -5.700 
Netherlands -4.506 -4.145 
New Zealand -3.683  -5.645 
Norway -5.872 -5.808 
Sweden -6.079 -6.068 
UK -5.576 -5.493 
US -5.664 -5.641 
Critical values for Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance are -3.58
and -2.93. Lag length on ADF chosen using Akaike Criterion24
Table 5. Unit root tests for log levels and first differences of log
levels of real equity prices; long-term UK and US times series.













Note: t values are listed beneath the coefficients; 
the superscripts a and b indicate significance at the
.01 and .05 levels. 